Tactics, (manuscript, [9]).
(battlefields, boxes, cells, targets, time slots, etc.) with a vector of values (costs) c = (c i , i = 1, ..., n). AT is trying to destroy these sites by placing "bombs" that can result in explosions and destruction, and DF is trying to protect these sites by distributing "locks" among them. One or more bombs can be placed into the same site. A lock is a protection device which, placed in a site, prevents its destruction with any number of bombs in it. Thus, locks and bombs are just the names of discrete units of resources of protection and destruction. The number of locks k, k < n, can be fixed (paper [10] ) or it can be a random variable, obtained, e.g., if a lock appears in site i with probability λ i independently of other sites. The latter case is the subject of paper [6] . Here we discuss only the case of k locks. AT has m, m = 1, 2, ..., bombs to allocate among n boxes. A box is destroyed if at least one explosion occurs, and the explosions of different bombs in the same site or in different sites are independent. We denote p the probability of explosion.
The important feature of our model is that AT can and will test every site, trying to find sites without locks. This testing is not perfect: a test of site i may have a positive result, S i = 1, even if there is no lock at the site, T i = 0, and negative, S i = 0, even if there is a lock, T i = 1. The probabilities of correct identification of both types, in a statistical language the sensitivity and specificity, P (S i = 1|T i = 1) = a i and P (S i = 0|T i = 0) = b i , are known to both players. The result of testing is a vector of signals s = (s 1 , ..., s n ), where each s i = 0, 1, known to AT.
When the number of locks k, k < n, is fixed, then the strategy of the defender (DF) is a probability distribution b(γ) on a set of all possible positions of locks {γ}, where γ = (i 1 , i 2 , ..., i k ) with 1 ≤ i 1 < ... < i k ≤ n. In our Bayesian setting we assume that this prior distribution b(γ) is known to AT, although of course the actual positions of the locks are not. After the locks are allocated, AT receives signal s and, having m bombs, distributes them among n sites deterministically or using some randomization, trying to maximize the expected sum of values of all destroyed sites. WLOG, we can assume that this distribution is deterministic and an optimal strategy of AT π(m|b(γ)), with respect to a strategy of DF b(γ), is a collection of her optimal responses u(s|m, b(γ)) ≡ u(s) = (u 1 (s), ..., u n (s)) to each signal s, where u i (s) is the number of bombs placed into site i, i = 1, ..., n. Using prior distribution b(γ), the probabilities of signals p(s) ≡ p(s|b(γ)), the aposterior distribution of the positions of locks b(γ|s), the optimal strategy π(m|b(γ)) and the corresponding total expected damage (loss), L(b(γ), can be calculated. The goal of DF is to select a prior distribution of locks b * (γ) to minimize this loss. Then the pair (b * (γ), π * ), where π * is an optimal response of AT to strategy b * (γ), forms a classical Nash equilibrium (NE) point. The corresponding value of the game is v * = L(b * (γ), π * )).
Though b * (γ) are not unique, they all have common properties that result in a unique (up to some randomization) AT strategy π * , and thus a specific value of v * . We denote G ≡ G(n, k, m|a, b, c) this general Locks, Bombs and Testing (LBT) game (model), where n is the number of sites, k is the number of locks, and n-dimensional vectors a = (a i ), b = (b i ) and c = (c i ), i = 1, 2, ..., n, represent the sensitivities and the specificities of testing, and the values of all sites.
Note that sites, locks, bombs and testing in this model are rather abstract terms and may have very different interpretation beyond our initial exposition of the DF and AT defence-attack game. For example, the American presidential elections with the distribution of efforts [resources] between ground battle states, with polls serving as testing tools, fit this model. In biology and medicine, sites may represent parts of the body (organs) and bombs units of treatment (chemo, radiation) delivered to metastatic points and subjected to limitation for a total dose (amount). In Search theory, locks are hidden objects and bombs are resources spent on detection of the objects. In repair/maintenance models one may consider locks as hidden defective blocks and bombs as some maintenance/repair units. The number of bombs in an i-th site (block) defines the probability of repair of this site. Thus, the described game is very flexible and allows generalizations in many directions: continuous resources, diverse locks and bombs, fake locks, etc. For example, we can assume that locks can not protect sites from destruction but can distort signals, and then such model will have common features with modern Bayesian persuasion models.
There are many possible modifications of the LBT game. We mention only some of them. We assumed that the parameters a i , b i , i = 1, ..., n are known to DF. Without this assumption the solution should be quite different. We assumed that the prior distribution of locks is known to AT. This assumption can be somewhat relaxed but the discussion of this subject leads us to the deeper levels of Game Theory. 
Symmetrical LBT model

Setup
The general G game and the straightforward approach to solving it, described above, have two basic drawbacks. First, the set of possible positions for locks, i.e., the set of subsets of an n element set, has order 2 n , and so does the set of potential signals. As a result, the calculations of posterior distributions b(γ|s) and their marginal distributions α i (s) = P (T i = 0|s) which play a crucial role in the description of optimal strategies, become cumbersome for large n. The second problem is that the knowledge of detailed information about the values of c i , a i , and b i in many cases is unrealistic. As a result, the main focus in papers [6] and [10] was on the analysis of a simpler symmetrical LBT critical ratios defined in this section. In the second part, we have to solve an optimization problem of bombs allocation using signal s = (s 1 , ..., s n ), the aposterior distribution of locks, and the explosion function p(u), i.e., the probability of at least one explosion of u bombs.
In both general and symmetrical models, there are also two possible assumptions about the number of locks k: problem A(n, k), where the number of locks k is fixed, and problem B(n, λ), where each of n sites has a lock with probability λ independently of other sites. In S-LBT model, DF, having no information about AT, uses the uniform distribution of locks, and we have a one-sided problem to find an optimal strategy for AT. In problem A(n, k), this uniform prior distribution in statistical physics is called
Fermi-Dirac statistics and any combination of k protected boxes has the same probability 1/ n k . It is easy to show that the probability of protection for a particular box is t = k n .
In problem B(n, λ), the number of locks has a binomial distribution with parameters n, λ.
In both S-LBT models, in the first, statistical part of the solution, given signal s = (s 1 , ..., s n ), instead of using the aposterior distribution of locks, it is sufficient to analyze only two critical ratios: ratio r for problem B(n, λ), and r(x) for problem A(n, k):
As a result, the optimal strategy in both problems will have a much simpler structure than in the general case, symmetrical with respect to all sites with negative (minus) signals, and correspondingly for sites with positive (plus) signals. In this statistical part, the explosion function p(u) and the strategy of bombs allocation do not participate at all.
Though the solutions of both problems have certain similarities, some of their features are very distinct. For example, an interesting and even counterintuitive property is that in problem A(n, k), the function r(x) and therefore the optimal strategy and the value function, depend on a and b only through the value q = a 1 − a
characteristic of the quality of testing. In problem B(n, λ), this property is not true with respect to the value r. The other important distinction between these two problems is that in the former problem the minuses and pluses in different boxes are not independent, but in the latter problem they are.
In both problems, DF and AT know all relevant parameters and prior distribution b(γ), but only AT knows the signal. The reader is advised to consider the outcomes as a result of a two-stage random experiment. In problem B(n, λ), at the first stage, a lock appears in every site independently of other sites with probability λ. In problem A(n, k), k locks are distributed at random between n sites, where k is a fixed number.
After that, at the second stage, in both problems, all n sites are tested. The results of the tests are independent from site to site and depend only on whether a lock is in the site or not. Formally, we consider random variables T i , S i , C i , i = 1, 2, ..., n, taking two values, 0 and 1; T i = 1, (0) means that the i-th site has a lock, (no lock); S i = 1 or +, (0 or −), means that the test of the i-th site is positive, (negative),
means that the i-th site is destroyed, (not destroyed). The absence of subindex i means that we discuss an arbitrary site, e.g., P (T = 0|S = 0), etc. The outcomes of the two-stage random experiment described above, i.e., the elements of the probability space, are pairs (γ, s), where
(vector) position of k locks and s = (s 1 , ..., s n ) is a (vector) signal. The probability of each outcome is P (γ, s) = b(γ)P (s|γ), where b(γ) is the prior distribution of locks and
.., S n = s n |γ).
Optimal Strategies and Values in a Symmetrical LBT Model
To solve LBT models means to find an optimal strategy and the corresponding value function, i.e., the value of the functional under the optimal strategy. A strategy π ≡ π(·|m, s) = (u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u n |m, s), n j=1 u(j) = m, is an allocation of m bombs in n sites, given signal s, defined for all m and s. We will skip sometimes to indicate dependence on m.
The symmetry in the S-LBT model implies two useful formulas
The first equality is almost obvious, since the symmetry of signals and bombs allocation implies that P (s|N = x) = c(x), i.e., all signals with the same number of minuses x have the same probability. Then, since the number of such signals is n x and s P (s|N = x) = P (N = x), we obtain that P (s) is given by the first formula in (2) . The second formula in (2) can be obtained from the first one used for the cases of n and n − 1 sites. Let us denote B − (s) and B + (s) the sets of minuses and pluses, given signal s.
Then, using the second equality in formula (2) , and the definitions of p
given in formula (1), we obtain that, given signal s with N(s) = x, and a strategy π = (u 1 , ..., u n |s) for m bombs, the value of a strategy π is
Let Then a) if x = 0 or n, then the optimal strategy is to distribute all bombs between the sites UAP and the value function v(m|0) = v(m|n) for m = n * i + e, i = 0, 1, ..., 0 ≤ e < n, is given by formula
b) if 0 < x < n, then the optimal strategy is to distribute all bombs between the minus and the plus sites d(x)-UAP, where d(x) is defined by formula
q = 1 − p, and r(x) is defined by formula (1).
The value function v(x, m) for m = m − + m + = i * x + e + j * (n − x) + e ′ , where the tuple (i, e, j, e ′ ) is (uniquely) defined by value x and a d(x)-UAP strategy, is given by formula
c) The value function v(m), m = 1, 2, ..., is given by formula
Remark 1. Similarly, for the game G(n = 3, k = 1, m = 1) with vector of values c = (4, 3, 2), it is easy to obtain that the optimal distribution of a unique lock is given by b(γ) = ( , 1) and thus c i * α i = v * = 12 7 , i = 1, 2 and v * > c 3 = 1. In both examples, the optimal strategy of DF is unique, but for larger values of n this is not the case, though all optimal b * (γ) have the same probabilities α i = P (T i = 0). A similar situation holds in the general case. We present here the theorem for the game G(n, k, m = 1). We present the full version of this theorem for any m and its proof in the extended paper. 
In other words, if k * < n, then the sites with numbers greater than k * should not be protected at all, and the distribution of k locks in the first k * sites should make all sites equally desirable for attack. For a Bayesian zero-sum game, this equality is a wellknown fact called the Principle of Indifference, (see e.g. [7] or [1] .) Citing the latter text, "Player 1 searches for a strategy that makes Player 2 indifferent as to which of the (good) pure strategies to use". The similar statement for Player 2 in our case has a different character. In layman terms: if the strength of a chain is defined by the strength of the weakest link, and the resources to make links strong are limited, then make all links of equal strength. This is a special case of a more general "Chain-Link Optimization Principle" that can be applied to many other optimizations problems, ( [11] ).
Note also that for any vector of values c, the number k < k * , the optimal strategy b * (γ) is always randomized and value v * > c k * +1 . As a result, AT will allocate her m bombs among the first k * sites if m ≤ k * .
An interesting situation appears when there is a mixture of full informative and non informative sites, i.e., when a i = b i = 1 for some sites and a i = b i = 1 = 1/2 for all others. Then a theorem similar to Theorem 1 can be proved with an explicit description of optimal the strategies for both players.
Of course, the main interest in the Bayesian LBT game problem is the case of imperfect but informative testing. This means that 1/2 < a i , b i < 1, i = 1, ..., n. To obtain the description of NE points, we have to solve three problems.
The first problem is, given a strategy of DF b(γ), to describe the optimal strategy (response) of AT π(m|b(γ)), i.e., to describe the optimal allocation of bombs u(s|m)
given signal s and m available bombs. The full answer to this problem is given by a recursive procedure S described in [10] . The expected value of damage (loss) for the pair of strategies (b(γ), π(m|b(γ)) can also be obtained.
The second, more difficult, problem is to find the optimal strategy or strategies b * (γ) of DF, minimizing this loss. The heuristic meaning of the corresponding Theorem 3 is similar to the meaning of Theorem 1: these strategies have to make the potential expected losses in the sites, that are worth protecting, equal when AT applies her optimal response to b * (γ).
Given a strategy of DF b(γ), let us denote L i (s|m) the expected loss in site i when AT applies her optimal strategy given signal s, p(s) the probability of signal s and
is the corresponding expected loss. The third problem to be solved is to obtain the full description of all NE points, i.e., to describe all b * (γ) delivering the equality of L i (m) in Theorem 3. (ν i |γ 2 ) are e 2 , e 1 , e 3 , e 4 . Under our assumptions about a, b, we have e 2 < e 3 , e 4 < e 1 . To find the best response of AT for each value x and each signal s ≡ ν i , we have to compare the potential damage d 1 (s|x) to site 1 if a bomb is placed there, equal to c * P (T 1 = 0|s), with the similar potential damage to site 2, d 2 (s|x), equal to 1 * P (T 2 = 0|s). The real damage d(s|x) with optimal placement of a unique bomb is given by the maximum of these two functions for each s and x. We denote P (T i = 0|s) = α i (s).
Since b(γ 1 ) = x, b(γ 2 ) = 1 − x, for signal ν 1 we have α 1 (ν 1 ) = xe 1 /p(ν 1 ) and α 2 (ν 1 ) = (1 − x)e 2 /p(ν 1 ). Thus, the decision as to where to place the bomb is determined by . Since e 1 /e 2 > 1, we have ρ 1 < ρ 3 < ρ 2 < 1.
As a result, the interval (0, 1) is partitioned into four disjoint subintervals ∆ 1 = (0, ρ 1 ), ∆ 2 = (ρ 1 , ρ 3 ), ∆ 3 = (ρ 3 , ρ 2 ), ∆ 4 = (ρ 2 , 1). On subinterval ∆ 1 , where with high probability 1 − x the lock is in site 1, for all signals the bomb is placed into site 2; on ∆ 4 , where x is closer to 1, the situation is reversed, and for all signals the bomb is placed into site 1; on ∆ 2 for signal ν 1 the bomb moves to site 1; and for the three other signals it remains in site 2; on ∆ 3 for signal ν 2 , the bomb remains in site 2; and for the three other signals it moves to site 1. As a result, the function of the real damage They both can be expressed in explicit form, as a function of parameters c, e 1 , e 2 , e 3 , e 4
and k = e 1 /e 2 ≡ ab/(1 − a)(1 − b), as follows: 
For c = c * we obtain v * = d(ρ 1 ) = d(ρ 3 ) = a + b − ab.
The best strategy of AT depends on signal s, and is defined by functions d i (s|x * ).
Note that when the testing is perfect, a i = b i = 1, we have e 1 = 1, e 2 = e 3 = e 4 = 0 and obtain that x * = ρ 1 = 0, v * = 1. In other words, the only lock is placed into more valuable site 1, and the loss is equal to 1. If the testing is non-informative, a i = b i = 1 = 1/2, we have e 1 = e 2 = e 3 = e 4 = 1/4 and obtain that x * = It is interesting to note that in this example for 1 ≤ c ≤ c * the optimal strategy of DF is the same as in the case of noninformative case, i.e. α = ( This relatively simple example shows also that the exact solution of a general G game can be a challenging problem.
